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Single Idea 12067
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
]
Full Idea
An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition of the entity in question.
Gist of Idea
An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition
Source
Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro)
Book Ref
Witt,Charlotte: 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle' [Cornell 1994], p.2
A Reaction
This is a simple and necessity corrective to the simplistic idea that Aristotle thought that essences just were definitions. Aristotle believes in real essences, not linguistic essences.
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[essence just is the successful definition of a thing]:
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21259
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To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is
[Plato]
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10963
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A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
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11292
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Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition
[Aristotle]
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11287
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Essence is what is stated in the definition
[Aristotle, by Politis]
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12091
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If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence
[Aristotle, by Witt]
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12146
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Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences
[Aristotle]
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11200
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The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form
[Aquinas]
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17865
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Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula
[Descartes, by Almog]
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12981
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Essence is just the possibility of a thing
[Leibniz]
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23647
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Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define
[Reid]
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12067
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An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition
[Witt]
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14260
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An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object
[Fine,K]
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11179
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If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence
[Fine,K]
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16551
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Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition
[Lowe]
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17309
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For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions
[Koslicki]
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17315
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We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions
[Koslicki]
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17866
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Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths
[Almog]
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17868
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Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases
[Almog]
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17871
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Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind
[Almog]
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17872
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Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes
[Almog]
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17953
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Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates
[Vetter]
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