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Single Idea 12981

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition ]

Full Idea

Essence is fundamentally nothing but the possibility of the thing under consideration. Something which is thought possible is expressed by a definition.

Gist of Idea

Essence is just the possibility of a thing

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.03)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'New Essays on Human Understanding', ed/tr. Remnant/Bennett [CUP 1996], p.293

A Reaction

It is unclear whether he means 'possible modes of existence' or 'possible actions of the thing'. Leibniz sees more clearly than Aristotle that essences extend beyond the actual thing, because Leibniz is more aware of the active powers.

Related Idea

Idea 13087 The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]

The 21 ideas with the same theme [essence just is the successful definition of a thing]:

21259 To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato]
10963 A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
11292 Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle]
11287 Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis]
12091 If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
12146 Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
11200 The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
17865 Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
12981 Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
23647 Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
12067 An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
14260 An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
11179 If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
16551 Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
17866 Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
17868 Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
17871 Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
17872 Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]