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Single Idea 17274

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation ]

Full Idea

For philosophers interested in explanation - of what accounts for what - it is largely through the notion of ontological ground that such questions are to be pursued. Ground, if you like, stands to philosophy as cause stands to science.

Gist of Idea

Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science)

Source

Kit Fine (Guide to Ground [2012], 1.02)

Book Ref

'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.40

A Reaction

Why does the ground have to be 'ontological'? It isn't the existence of the snow that makes me cold, but the fact that I am lying in it. Better to talk of 'factual' ground (or 'determinative' ground), and then causal grounds are a subset of those?

The 21 ideas from 'Guide to Ground'

17271 Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K]
17272 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K]
17273 Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
17280 Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K]
17281 If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K]
17274 Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K]
17278 We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K]
17279 Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
17276 If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K]
17275 Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
17277 If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
17283 If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K]
17284 An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K]
17285 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K]
17286 Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
17287 Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
17289 Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
17290 Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K]
17291 We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K]
17288 We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K]