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Single Idea 8821

[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth ]

Full Idea

Jesus: I came into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?

Gist of Idea

Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth?

Source

St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 18:37-8)

Book Ref

'The Bible', ed/tr. the Church [Collins 1950], p.519


A Reaction

There is very little explicit discussion of truth in philosophy before this exchange (apart from Ideas 251 and 586), and there isn't any real debate prior to Russell and the pragmatists. What was Pilate's tone? Did he spit at the end of his question?

Related Ideas

Idea 251 Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato]

Idea 586 Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]


The 29 ideas with the same theme [question of whether truth can be defined, and how]:

Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes]
Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel]
Genuine truth is the resolution of the highest contradiction [Hegel]
Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege]
You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein]
We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton]
If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter]
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten]
Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach]
Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach]
If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach]
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]