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Single Idea 16780

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier ]

Full Idea

In a tree the part of the form that is in the leaf is not the same character as the part that is in the fruit., but yet they are partial forms, and apt to be united ….to compose one complete form of the whole.

Gist of Idea

Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree

Source

Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.10.30), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.6

Book Ref

Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.631

A Reaction

This is a common scholastic view, the main opponent of which was Aquinas, who says each thing only has one form. Do leaves have different DNA from the bark or the fruit? Presumably not (since I only have one DNA), which supports Aquinas.

The 18 ideas from Francisco Suárez

16667 Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
17007 Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
16780 Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
16758 The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
16682 Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez]
16743 We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
16742 We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
16665 There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
16666 A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
22143 Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
22146 Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
22145 Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
22144 Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
22147 Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
22148 Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
22149 Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
7563 The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley]
13074 Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]