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Single Idea 21638

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax ]

Full Idea

Syntactic form is not only related to the truth conditions of a sentence; it is also related to what focus an utterance of a sentence will have.

Gist of Idea

Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions

Source

Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.5.2)

Book Ref

Hofweber,Thomas: 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' [OUP 2018], p.42


A Reaction

Hofweber has commendably studied some linguistics. The idea of mental and linguistic 'focus' increasingly strikes me as of importance in many areas of philosophy. E.g. in the scope of ethics, on whom should you focus?


The 30 ideas from 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics'

Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber]
Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber]
'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber]
If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber]
Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber]
'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber]
'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber]
The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber]
Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber]
'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber]
The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber]
Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber]
Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber]
How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber]
Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber]
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber]
Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber]
Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber]
'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber]
Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber]
There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber]
'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber]
The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber]