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Single Idea 8884

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism ]

Full Idea

You could detect the absence of an eleven-dot pattern without having counted the dots, so your phenomenal concept of that array is not an arithmetical concept, and its content will not yield that its dots do indeed number eleven.

Gist of Idea

The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven

Source

Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.3)

Book Ref

Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.128

A Reaction

Sosa is discussing foundational epistemology, but this draws attention to the gulf that has to be leaped by structuralists. If eleven is not derived from the pattern, where does it come from? Presumably two eleven-dotters are needed, to map them.

The 19 ideas with the same theme [denials that mathematics is rooted in experience]:

9861 The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
21963 It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes]
16928 Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
12411 Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill]
5656 Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill]
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
8633 There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege]
9577 The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
17697 The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert]
5399 Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell]
17806 It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
10735 Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
8884 The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
18201 General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
17614 The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
9610 Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR]
9612 There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR]
10131 If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman]
10005 Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]