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Single Idea 9623

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics ]

Full Idea

Field needs the notion of logical consequence in second-order logic, but (since this is not recursively axiomatizable) this is a semantical notion, which involves the idea of 'true in all models', a set-theoretic idea if there ever was one.

Gist of Idea

Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets

Source

comment on Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], Ch.4) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics

Book Ref

Brown,James Robert: 'Philosophy of Mathematics' [Routledge 2002], p.54

A Reaction

Brown here summarises a group of critics. Field was arguing for modern nominalism, that actual numbers could (in principle) be written out of the story, as useful fictions. Popper's attempt to dump induction seemed to need induction.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [maths as a necessity for empirical investigation]:

17536 If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg]
18198 Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted [Quine]
9556 Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine]
9941 Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam]
18199 Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam]
8857 We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam]
8732 It is spooky the way mathematics anticipates physics [Weinberg]
18150 Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock]
3143 Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic [Rey]
10261 The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro]
18218 Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H]
9623 Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H]
8863 We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo]
18204 Scientists posit as few entities as possible, but set theorist posit as many as possible [Maddy]
18207 Maybe applications of continuum mathematics are all idealisations [Maddy]
14604 If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
8712 Mathematics should be treated as true whenever it is indispensable to our best physical theory [Friend]