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Single Idea 18391

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism ]

Full Idea

I define 'naturalism' as the hypothesis that the world of space-time is all that there is.

Gist of Idea

'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists

Source

David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.112

A Reaction

This is helpful, because it doesn't mention the nature of the physical matter contained in space-time, leaving theories like panpsychism as possible naturalistic theories. Galen Strawson, for example.

The 133 ideas from David M. Armstrong

8505 Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
8506 Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
8507 Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
3900 Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton]
4253 Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong]
15542 All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis]
15547 Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis]
5690 A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
5493 If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
4600 Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
6498 Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
14330 To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
11003 The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read]
4032 The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong]
7429 Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong]
7432 One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong]
7434 Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong]
7431 The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong]
7436 The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong]
7437 Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
7438 A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong]
7440 Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong]
5492 How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong]
4036 What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8533 Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
4035 There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
8540 The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
8541 Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
10729 Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver]
15544 If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis]
10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
4031 It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
18468 Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
18368 For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong]
18370 A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong]
18371 The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
18372 We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
18373 If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
18374 Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong]
18375 General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong]
18377 Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]
18378 Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
18379 The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
18380 Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong]
18381 Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong]
18382 The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong]
18384 One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
18385 Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong]
18386 What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
18387 The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
18388 Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
18389 When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
18390 All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong]
18393 For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong]
18392 Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong]
18391 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong]
18394 In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
18396 The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong]
18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
18400 Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
18401 The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong]
4437 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
4438 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]
4434 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
4435 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
4436 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
4431 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
4433 Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
4439 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
4440 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
4432 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
4446 It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
4445 If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
4444 One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
4448 Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
4442 Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong]
12677 Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
16246 Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong]
9480 Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong]
8582 Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis]
17662 Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong]
17664 Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong]
17663 If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]
17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
17668 It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong]
17669 Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong]
17671 A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong]
17670 Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong]
17672 A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong]
17674 The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong]
17675 Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
17676 Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong]
17680 The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
17677 Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong]
17678 Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong]
17679 All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
17681 The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong]
17682 A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong]
17683 Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
17684 To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong]
17685 Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]
17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
17688 Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong]
17689 Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong]
17690 Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG]
17691 Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong]
17692 We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong]
17693 The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong]
17686 Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong]
15442 Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis]
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]