more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
My charge is that truth-maker theory cannot be integrated into an attractive general account of non-causal dependence.
Gist of Idea
Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence
Source
David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.6)
Book Ref
'Metaphysical Grounding', ed/tr. Correia,F/Schnieder,B [CUP 2012], p.264
A Reaction
[You'll have to read Liggins to see why]
| 10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 18470 | Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B] |
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| 18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
| 14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |