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Single Idea 18477

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths ]

Full Idea

It's not obvious that there are enough positive states out there to underwrite all the negative truths. Even though it may be true that this liquid is odourless this needn't be because there's something further about it that excludes its being odourless.

Gist of Idea

There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths

Source

Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.4.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.14


A Reaction

What is the ontological status of all these hypothetical truths? What is the truthmaker for 'a trillion trillion negative truths exist'? What is the status of 'this is not not-red'?


The 25 ideas from Fraser MacBride

'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride]
Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride]
It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride]
Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride]
For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride]
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]