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Single Idea 18869
[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
]
Full Idea
If negative truths don't have truthmakers then make no mistake: they are ungrounded.
Gist of Idea
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec')
Book Ref
'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.107
A Reaction
What would be the grounding for truths which expressed the necessary preconditions for all existence? Could 'nothing whatever exists' ever be a truth?
The
14 ideas
from 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology'
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18879
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What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
[Cameron]
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18880
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Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
[Cameron]
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18881
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For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
[Cameron]
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18869
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Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
[Cameron]
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18870
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Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
[Cameron]
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18871
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I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
[Cameron]
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18867
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Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
[Cameron]
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18873
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God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
[Cameron]
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18868
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Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
[Cameron]
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18872
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We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds
[Cameron]
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18877
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Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
[Cameron]
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18874
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Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
[Cameron]
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18875
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Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
[Cameron]
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18878
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Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
[Cameron]
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