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Single Idea 18484

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers ]

Full Idea

For Martin the fatal error of phenomenalists was their inability to supply credible truth-makers for truths about unobserved objects; the same error afflicted Ryle's behaviourism, ...and Prior's Presentism (for past-tensed and future-tensed truths).

Gist of Idea

Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers

Source

Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.22


A Reaction

This seems to be the original motivation for the modern rise of the truthmaker idea. Personally I find 'Napoleon won at Austerlitz' is a perfectly good past-tensed truthmaker which is compatible with presentism. Truth-making is an excellent challenge.


The 8 ideas with the same theme [supporting the idea that all truths have truthmakers]:

Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil]
Truth and falsehood must track what does or doesn't exist [Bigelow]
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]