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Full Idea
The most popular view is that an object is a truthmaker if the object couldn't exist and the truth be false. But contingent predications are also held to need truthmakers. Socrates is not necessarily snub-nosed, so a trope or state of affairs is needed.
Gist of Idea
Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers')
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.267
A Reaction
Cameron calls this 'some heavy ontological commitments'. If snub-nosedness is necessitated by the trope of 'being snub-nosed', what is the truthmaker for Socrates having that trope?
| 13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
| 15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
| 18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |