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Single Idea 18358

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker. For example, 'L is happy or L is hungry', and 'L is happy or L is thirsty', which are both made true by the fact that L is happy.

Gist of Idea

Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker

Source

Marian David (Truth-making and Correspondence [2009], 1)

Book Ref

'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.141

The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about what determines truths]:

10915 The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
6090 Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
18901 Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
10365 We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
15546 Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
10906 Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10909 Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10907 The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10912 Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
18358 Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
18483 The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
18879 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
18880 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
18874 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
18860 A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
18919 There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
18915 If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]