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Single Idea 18860

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

A 'minimal' truth-maker is the 'smallest' portion of reality required to make a given proposition true.

Gist of Idea

A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job

Source

Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 01.2)

Book Ref

Tallant,Jonathan: 'Metaphysics - an introduction' [Continuum 2011], p.6


A Reaction

A nice suggestion. This seems to make Ockham's Razor an integral part of the theory of truth-makers. I would apply the same principle to explanations. An Ockhamist explanation is what explains the puzzling thing - and nothing else.


The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about what determines truths]:

The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]