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Single Idea 18874

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

It's definitely not sufficient to be a realist that one be a truthmaker theorist, since one can simply be anti-realist about the truthmakers.

Gist of Idea

Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers

Source

Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism')

Book Ref

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.116

A Reaction

It is not quite clear how unreal truth makers could actually MAKE propositions true, rather than just being correlated with them.

The 14 ideas from 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology'

18879 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
18880 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
18869 Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
18870 Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
18871 I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
18867 Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
18873 God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
18868 Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
18872 We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
18877 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
18874 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
18878 Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]