more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 18568

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy ]

Full Idea

Peacocke's 'Simple Account' says philosophers should determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for possessing a concept, and psychologists should explain how the human mind meets these conditions.

Gist of Idea

Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession

Source

report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Edouard Machery - Doing Without Concepts 2

Book Ref

Machery,Edouard: 'Doing Without Concepts' [OUP 2009], p.31


A Reaction

One can't restrict philosophy so easily. Psychologists could do that job themselves, and dump philosophy. Philosophy is interested in the role of concepts in meaning, experience and judgement. If psychologists can contribute to philosophy, fine.


The 13 ideas from 'A Study of Concepts'

Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]