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Single Idea 15395

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism ]

Full Idea

We could abandon the view that truthmakers necessitate the truth of that which makes them true, and say that an object makes a truth when its intrinsic nature suffices for that truth. The object would have a different intrinsic nature if the truth failed.

Gist of Idea

Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths?

Source

Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers')

Book Ref

'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.267


A Reaction

[He cites Josh Parsons 1999, 2005 for this] This approach seems closely related to Kit Fine's proposal that necessities arise from the natures of things. It sounds to me as if an object with that intrinsic nature would necessitate that truth.

Related Idea

Idea 15394 Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]


The 11 ideas with the same theme [makers that ground truths also force them to be true]:

Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
God might necessitate that something happen, but He is not the truth-maker for it [Smith,B]
The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil]
It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron]
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]