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Single Idea 18704

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles ]

Full Idea

Philosophy is the attempt to be rid of a particular kind of puzzlement. This 'philosophical' puzzlement is one of the intellect and not of instinct. Philosophical puzzles are irrelevant to our every-day life.

Gist of Idea

Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life

Source

Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], A I.1)

Book Ref

Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Lectures in Cambridge 1930-32', ed/tr. Lee,Desmond [Blackwell 1980], p.1

A Reaction

All enquiry begins with puzzles, and they are cured by explanations, which result in understanding. In that sense he is right. I entirely disagree that the puzzles are irrelevant to daily life.

The 35 ideas from 'Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)'

18704 Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein]
18706 Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein]
18705 Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
18707 All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein]
18708 Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein]
18709 Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein]
18727 A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
18710 Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein]
18711 A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
18712 Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein]
18713 If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein]
18719 Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein]
18714 We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein]
18715 Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein]
18716 A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein]
18717 Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein]
18718 Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
18720 Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein]
18721 Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein]
18723 We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
18724 In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein]
18725 A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
18726 For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
18728 The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
18729 Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
18730 The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein]
18732 We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein]
18731 There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein]
18733 Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein]
18734 If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein]
18735 Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein]
18736 Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein]
18737 There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein]
18738 We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein]
18280 We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein]