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Single Idea 5417
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
]
Full Idea
A good theory of truth must be such as to admit of its opposite, falsehood.
Gist of Idea
A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible
Source
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.70
The
87 ideas
from 'Problems of Philosophy'
|
6510
|
Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
|
6514
|
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
|
6415
|
After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
|
7290
|
If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa
[Russell, by Thompson]
|
|
13468
|
Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless
[Russell, by Hart,WD]
|
|
21724
|
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
|
5357
|
It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge
[Russell]
|
|
5358
|
'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses
[Russell]
|
|
5359
|
Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain
[Russell]
|
|
5362
|
It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist
[Russell]
|
|
5365
|
Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world
[Russell]
|
|
5363
|
If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions
[Russell]
|
|
5367
|
Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic
[Russell]
|
|
5364
|
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves
[Russell]
|
|
5361
|
Philosophers must get used to absurdities
[Russell]
|
|
5368
|
Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent
[Russell]
|
|
5366
|
We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection
[Russell]
|
|
5370
|
Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them
[Russell]
|
|
5371
|
Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate
[Russell]
|
|
5369
|
It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it
[Russell]
|
|
5372
|
There is no reason to think that objects have colours
[Russell]
|
|
5373
|
'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental
[Russell]
|
|
5376
|
I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted
[Russell]
|
|
5375
|
Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things
[Russell]
|
|
5379
|
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds
[Russell]
|
|
5378
|
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance
[Russell]
|
|
5382
|
We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals
[Russell, by PG]
|
|
5389
|
Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience
[Russell]
|
|
5377
|
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements
[Russell]
|
|
5383
|
Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal
[Russell]
|
|
5386
|
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind
[Russell]
|
|
5385
|
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description
[Russell]
|
|
5384
|
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'
[Russell]
|
|
5387
|
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual
[Russell]
|
|
5380
|
In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data
[Russell]
|
|
5381
|
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person
[Russell]
|
|
5388
|
Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted
[Russell]
|
|
5393
|
We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws
[Russell]
|
|
5391
|
Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions
[Russell]
|
|
5390
|
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck
[Russell]
|
|
5394
|
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question
[Russell]
|
|
5392
|
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will
[Russell]
|
|
5397
|
The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience
[Russell]
|
|
5399
|
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it
[Russell]
|
|
5401
|
The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction
[Russell]
|
|
5395
|
Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true
[Russell]
|
|
5396
|
Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle
[Russell]
|
|
5400
|
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four
[Russell]
|
|
5398
|
Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value
[Russell]
|
|
5407
|
That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals
[Russell]
|
|
4427
|
Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth
[Russell]
|
|
4428
|
Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives)
[Russell]
|
|
5406
|
Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals
[Russell]
|
|
4479
|
All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all
[Russell, by Loux]
|
|
4030
|
Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations)
[Russell, by Mellor/Oliver]
|
|
5409
|
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist'
[Russell]
|
|
5408
|
If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought
[Russell]
|
|
4441
|
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal
[Russell]
|
|
4429
|
If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality
[Russell]
|
|
5405
|
The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things
[Russell]
|
|
4430
|
All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals
[Russell]
|
|
5411
|
We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given
[Russell]
|
|
5410
|
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red
[Russell]
|
|
5412
|
Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident
[Russell]
|
|
5413
|
Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles
[Russell]
|
|
5415
|
As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees
[Russell]
|
|
5416
|
If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct
[Russell]
|
|
5414
|
Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past
[Russell]
|
|
21711
|
Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
|
5427
|
Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents
[Russell]
|
|
5425
|
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two
[Russell]
|
|
5418
|
In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths
[Russell]
|
|
5426
|
Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself
[Russell]
|
|
5419
|
Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements
[Russell]
|
|
5420
|
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities
[Russell]
|
|
5417
|
A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible
[Russell]
|
|
5422
|
More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible
[Russell]
|
|
5423
|
If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent
[Russell]
|
|
5424
|
Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth
[Russell]
|
|
7395
|
Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence
[Joslin on Russell]
|
|
5428
|
Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't
[Russell]
|
|
5421
|
The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth
[Russell]
|
|
5431
|
Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion'
[Russell]
|
|
5430
|
A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning
[Russell]
|
|
5429
|
True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief
[Russell]
|
|
5432
|
Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole
[Russell]
|
|
5434
|
Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom
[Russell]
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