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Single Idea 4726

[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth ]

Full Idea

Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers.

Gist of Idea

Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers

Source

report of Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [1980]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.4

Book Ref

O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.108


A Reaction

This may be a caricature of Rorty, but he certainly seems to be in the business of denying truth as much as possible. This strikes me as the essence of pragmatism, and as a kind of philosophical nihilism.


The 15 ideas from 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'

Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]