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Single Idea 19318

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth ]

Full Idea

A 'sequence' of objects is like a set of objects, except that, unlike a set, the order of the objects is important when dealing with sequences. ...An infinite sequence satisfies 'x2 is purple' if and only if the second member of the sequence is purple.

Gist of Idea

A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them

Source

Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4)

Book Ref

Kirkham,Richard L.: 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction' [MIT 1995], p.154


A Reaction

This explains why Tarski needed set theory in his metalanguage.


The 7 ideas from Richard L. Kirkham

There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]