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Single Idea 19319

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth ]

Full Idea

If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do. ...Thus it matters not whether we define truth as satisfaction by some sequence or as satisfaction by all sequences.

Gist of Idea

If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do

Source

Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.4)

Book Ref

Kirkham,Richard L.: 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction' [MIT 1995], p.157


A Reaction

So if the striker scores a goal, the team has scored a goal.

Related Idea

Idea 19318 A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]


The 7 ideas from Richard L. Kirkham

There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]