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Single Idea 4616

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality ]

Full Idea

'Supervenience' means lower-level objects and properties suffice for the higher level ones, but the higher level is distinct from its ground, which is reflected in the higher level being governed by distinct laws of nature.

Gist of Idea

A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws

Source

John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.193

A Reaction

A nice summary of Davidson's idea. It feels wrong to me. Can I create some 'new laws of nature' by combining things novelly in a laboratory so that a supervenient state emerges. Sounds silly to me. Must we invoke God to achieve this?

The 37 ideas from 'Philosophy of Mind'

4588 There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil]
4587 From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil]
4586 You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil]
4591 Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil]
4592 If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil]
4590 If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil]
4593 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
4597 Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
4594 A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]
4595 No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil]
4596 The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil]
4598 Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
4601 Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil]
4602 Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil]
4599 Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil]
4603 Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil]
4607 Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil]
4605 Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil]
4606 To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil]
4604 If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil]
4609 It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil]
4614 Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil]
4624 If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil]
4625 Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil]
4619 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil]
4620 Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil]
4610 Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil]
4618 If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil]
4621 Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil]
4623 Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil]
4626 The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil]
4622 Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil]
4617 A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil]
4612 Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil]
4615 Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil]
4611 The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil]
4616 A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil]