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Single Idea 4714

[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth ]

Full Idea

Putnam replaces a correspondence theory of truth with an epistemic notion of truth - truth is idealized rational acceptability. The correspondence theory is committed to realism, but his allows ontological relativism.

Gist of Idea

Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism

Source

report of Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3

Book Ref

O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.73


A Reaction

This seems to be part of a slide by Putnam away from realism towards pragmatism. As a robust and defiant realist, this always strikes me as the road to hell.


The 22 ideas from 'Reason, Truth and History'

Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis]
If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady]
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam]
Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam]
Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam]
Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam]
There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam]
Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam]
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam]
If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam]
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam]
Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam]
For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam]