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Single Idea 5420
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
]
Full Idea
Although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, they are properties dependent upon the relations of the beliefs to other things, not upon any internal quality of the beliefs.
Gist of Idea
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities
Source
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Problems of Philosophy' [OUP 1995], p.70
A Reaction
Beliefs can have an intrinsic property of subjective certainty, but Russell is right that that is not enough. So is truth a property or a relation?
Related Idea
Idea 15323
Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten]
The
87 ideas
from 'Problems of Philosophy'
|
6510
|
Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
|
6514
|
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
|
6415
|
After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
|
7290
|
If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa
[Russell, by Thompson]
|
|
13468
|
Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless
[Russell, by Hart,WD]
|
|
21724
|
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
|
5357
|
It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge
[Russell]
|
|
5358
|
'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses
[Russell]
|
|
5359
|
Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain
[Russell]
|
|
5362
|
It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist
[Russell]
|
|
5365
|
Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world
[Russell]
|
|
5363
|
If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions
[Russell]
|
|
5367
|
Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic
[Russell]
|
|
5364
|
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves
[Russell]
|
|
5361
|
Philosophers must get used to absurdities
[Russell]
|
|
5368
|
Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent
[Russell]
|
|
5366
|
We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection
[Russell]
|
|
5370
|
Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them
[Russell]
|
|
5371
|
Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate
[Russell]
|
|
5369
|
It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it
[Russell]
|
|
5372
|
There is no reason to think that objects have colours
[Russell]
|
|
5373
|
'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental
[Russell]
|
|
5376
|
I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted
[Russell]
|
|
5375
|
Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things
[Russell]
|
|
5379
|
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds
[Russell]
|
|
5378
|
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance
[Russell]
|
|
5382
|
We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals
[Russell, by PG]
|
|
5389
|
Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience
[Russell]
|
|
5377
|
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements
[Russell]
|
|
5383
|
Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal
[Russell]
|
|
5386
|
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind
[Russell]
|
|
5385
|
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description
[Russell]
|
|
5384
|
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'
[Russell]
|
|
5387
|
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual
[Russell]
|
|
5380
|
In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data
[Russell]
|
|
5381
|
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person
[Russell]
|
|
5388
|
Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted
[Russell]
|
|
5393
|
We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws
[Russell]
|
|
5391
|
Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions
[Russell]
|
|
5390
|
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck
[Russell]
|
|
5394
|
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question
[Russell]
|
|
5392
|
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will
[Russell]
|
|
5397
|
The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience
[Russell]
|
|
5399
|
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it
[Russell]
|
|
5401
|
The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction
[Russell]
|
|
5395
|
Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true
[Russell]
|
|
5396
|
Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle
[Russell]
|
|
5400
|
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four
[Russell]
|
|
5398
|
Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value
[Russell]
|
|
5407
|
That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals
[Russell]
|
|
4427
|
Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth
[Russell]
|
|
4428
|
Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives)
[Russell]
|
|
5406
|
Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals
[Russell]
|
|
4479
|
All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all
[Russell, by Loux]
|
|
4030
|
Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations)
[Russell, by Mellor/Oliver]
|
|
5409
|
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist'
[Russell]
|
|
5408
|
If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought
[Russell]
|
|
4441
|
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal
[Russell]
|
|
4429
|
If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality
[Russell]
|
|
5405
|
The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things
[Russell]
|
|
4430
|
All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals
[Russell]
|
|
5411
|
We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given
[Russell]
|
|
5410
|
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red
[Russell]
|
|
5412
|
Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident
[Russell]
|
|
5413
|
Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles
[Russell]
|
|
5415
|
As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees
[Russell]
|
|
5416
|
If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct
[Russell]
|
|
5414
|
Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past
[Russell]
|
|
21711
|
Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
|
5427
|
Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents
[Russell]
|
|
5425
|
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two
[Russell]
|
|
5418
|
In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths
[Russell]
|
|
5426
|
Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself
[Russell]
|
|
5419
|
Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements
[Russell]
|
|
5420
|
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities
[Russell]
|
|
5417
|
A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible
[Russell]
|
|
5422
|
More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible
[Russell]
|
|
5423
|
If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent
[Russell]
|
|
5424
|
Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth
[Russell]
|
|
7395
|
Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence
[Joslin on Russell]
|
|
5428
|
Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't
[Russell]
|
|
5421
|
The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth
[Russell]
|
|
5431
|
Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion'
[Russell]
|
|
5430
|
A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning
[Russell]
|
|
5429
|
True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief
[Russell]
|
|
5432
|
Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole
[Russell]
|
|
5434
|
Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom
[Russell]
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