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Single Idea 6334

[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth ]

Full Idea

We must distinguish the function of the truth predicate, what it is to understand 'true', the meaning of 'true', grasping the concept of truth, and a theory of truth itself.

Gist of Idea

The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth?

Source

Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.2.8)

Book Ref

Horwich,Paul: 'Truth (2nd edn)' [OUP 1998], p.36


A Reaction

It makes you feel tired to think about it. Presumably every other philosophical analysis has to do this many jobs. Clearly Horwich wants to propose one account which will do all five jobs. Personally I don't believe these five are really distinct.


The 12 ideas from 'Truth (2nd edn)'

Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]