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Full Idea
Shadows are distinct from the physical objects casting the shadows and irreducible to them; any attempt at reduction would be incoherent, as it would entail identifying a shadow with the object of which it is a shadow.
Gist of Idea
Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible
Source
Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 6.3)
Book Ref
Maslin,Keith: 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [Polity 2001], p.167
A Reaction
Another failure to find a decent analogy for what is claimed in property dualism. A 'shadow' is a reification of the abstract concept of an absence of light. Objects lose their shadows at dusk, but the object itself doesn't change.
| 3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
| 3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
| 3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
| 3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
| 3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
| 3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
| 3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
| 3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
| 3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
| 3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |