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Single Idea 22211

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human) ]

Full Idea

We are left with the transcendence of the thing over against the perception of it, ...and thus a basic and essential difference arises between Being as Experience and Being as Thing.

Gist of Idea

As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge

Source

Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.2.042)

Book Ref

Husserl,Edmund: 'Ideas: general introduction to pure phenomenology', ed/tr. Boyce Gibson,W [Routledge 2012], p.78


A Reaction

I'm thinking that this is not just the germ of Heidegger's concept of Da-sein, but it actually IS his concept, without the label. Husserl had said that he hoped to reveal a new region of Being.

Related Idea

Idea 22209 Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]


The 44 ideas from Edmund Husserl

Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet]
There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl]
The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl]
The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
Only facts follow from facts [Husserl]
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl]
Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl]
Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl]
Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl]
'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl]
After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl]
Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]
As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl]
The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl]
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl]
Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl]
Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt]
Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam]
Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner]
Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck]
We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl]
Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl]
0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett]
Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege]
Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl]
If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl]