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Single Idea 5912

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism ]

Full Idea

Ceteris paribus, we should pay our debts rather than give our money in charity, when we cannot do both.

Clarification

'Ceteris paribus' means 'all things being equal'

Gist of Idea

We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity

Source

W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II)

Book Ref

Ross,W.David: 'The Right and the Good' [OUP 1930], p.30


A Reaction

This seems a neat objection to utilitarianism, though we could reply that the failure to repay a debt will lead to far more trouble, for you and for your creditor, than your failure to be charitable.


The 40 ideas from 'The Right and the Good'

Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross]
Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG]
We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross]
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross]
We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross]
The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross]
The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross]
Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross]
Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross]
People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross]
Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross]
Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross]
I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross]
An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross]
We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross]
No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross]
Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross]
Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross]
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross]
Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross]