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Single Idea 11918

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities ]

Full Idea

Pre-theoretically it does not seem to be the case that what is essential to a thing includes everything that is necessarily true of that thing.

Gist of Idea

The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it

Source

George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.4)

Book Ref

Molnar,George: 'Powers: a study in metaphysics', ed/tr. Mumford,Stephen [OUP 2003], p.37

A Reaction

This seems to me to be true. The simple point, which I take to be obvious, is that essential properties must at the very least be in some way important, whereas necessities can be trivial. I favour the idea that the essences create the necessities.

The 38 ideas from 'Powers'

11912 Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar]
11914 Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar]
11913 For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
11915 If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
11916 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
11917 Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
11918 The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
11919 Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar]
11920 A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
11927 Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar]
11921 The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar]
11928 Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
11956 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
11957 It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar]
11959 Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar]
11961 Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar]
11960 Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar]
11962 Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
11963 What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar]
9448 Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford]
11929 The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar]
11930 One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar]
11931 Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar]
11932 Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar]
11933 A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar]
11934 The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar]
11935 Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
11936 The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar]
11937 We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar]
11939 If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar]
11943 Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
11944 Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar]
11947 Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar]
11951 Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
11952 The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar]
11953 Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar]
11954 We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar]
11955 There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]