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Single Idea 16502

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity ]

Full Idea

Identity is a primitive notion.

Gist of Idea

Identity is primitive

Source

David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.1)

Book Ref

Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance' [Blackwell 1980], p.49


A Reaction

To be a true primitive it would have to be univocal, but it seems to me that 'identity' comes in degrees. The primitive concept is the minimal end of the degrees, but there are also more substantial notions of identity.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [whether identity can be defined - and how]:

You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett]
Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett]
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn]