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Single Idea 18671

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism ]

Full Idea

The ground for an attitude lies not in some other ethical concept, goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. ...We shall not be better off if we interpolate an indefinable characteristic of goodness besides.

Gist of Idea

The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics

Source

A.C. Ewing (The Definition of Good [1948], p.172), quoted by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 1.4

Book Ref

Orsi,Francesco: 'Value Theory' [Bloomsbury 2015], p.11

A Reaction

This is a forerunner of Scanlon's Buck-Passing theory of the source of value (in other properties). I approve of this approach. If I say 'actually this very strong cheese is really good', I'm not adding goodness to the cheese.

Related Idea

Idea 18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]

The 18 ideas with the same theme [there are no rules, so we must attend to details]:

4369 It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
5158 Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
5237 We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
23362 All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
20134 Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
24109 Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche]
2935 No two actions are the same [Nietzsche]
22475 Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
9256 I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
9257 The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
9262 The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
5908 Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
18671 The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]
22343 If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
21025 Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum]
18664 Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka]
20214 Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski]
4336 Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse]