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Single Idea 4336

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism ]

Full Idea

Any codification ranking the virtues, like any codification ranking the rules, is bound to come up against cases where we will want to change the rankings.

Gist of Idea

Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases

Source

Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2)

Book Ref

Hursthouse,Rosalind: 'On Virtue Ethics' [OUP 2001], p.57

A Reaction

This seems right, and yet it feels like a slippery slope. Am I supposed to be virtuous and wise, but have no principles? Infinite flexibility can lead straight to wickedness. Even the wise need something to hang on to.

The 30 ideas from 'On Virtue Ethics'

4325 Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse]
4324 Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
4327 Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse]
4328 Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse]
4335 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse]
4336 Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse]
4334 Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse]
4329 After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse]
4330 Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse]
4337 Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse]
4338 Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse]
4343 We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse]
4339 According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse]
4341 Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse]
4340 You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse]
4346 The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse]
4349 Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse]
4351 It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse]
4350 If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse]
4352 Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse]
4353 If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse]
4354 Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse]
4356 We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse]
4355 There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse]
4358 Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
4359 When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse]
4364 Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse]
4361 Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse]
4363 The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse]
4365 We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse]