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Single Idea 20025
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
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Full Idea
If an agent tries to do something by two different means, only one of which can succeed, then the behaviour is rational, even though one of them is an attempt to do an action which cannot succeed.
Gist of Idea
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
Source
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.8
A Reaction
[a concise account of a laborious account of an example from Bratman 1984, 1987] Bratman uses this to challenge the 'Simple View', that intention leads straightforwardly to action.
The
15 ideas
from Wilson,G/Schpall,S
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20012
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Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20013
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It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20014
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Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20016
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Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20017
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Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20018
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Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20019
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Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20021
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Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it?
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20022
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To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20023
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If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20025
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We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20028
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Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20027
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If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20029
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Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20031
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On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires
[Wilson/Schpall]
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