more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
If psychological states and action results cannot be identified independently of one another, then it does not make sense to describe one as causing the other.
Gist of Idea
Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other
Source
Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Conclusion')
Book Ref
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.82
A Reaction
This summarises a widely cited unease about the causal theory of action. Any account in action theory will need to separate out some components and explain their interrelation. Otherwise actions are primitives, and we can walk away.
| 20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
| 20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
| 20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
| 20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |