more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 10921

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity ]

Full Idea

Three degrees necessity in logic or semantics: first and least is attaching a semantical predicate to the names of statements (as Nec '9>5'); second and more drastic attaches to statements themselves; third and gravest attaches to open sentences.

Gist of Idea

Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences

Source

Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.158)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.158


The 24 ideas with the same theme [understanding the concept of necessity]:

Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle]
Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz]
Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking]
Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill]
Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill]
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche]
Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche]
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden]
Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach]
Scotus based modality on semantic consistency, instead of on what the future could allow [Walicki]
The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter]
It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter]