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Single Idea 11001

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity ]

Full Idea

The equation of 'necessity' with 'true in every possible world' is known as the S5 conception, corresponding to the strongest of C.I.Lewis's five modal systems.

Gist of Idea

Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity

Source

Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.4)

Book Ref

Read,Stephen: 'Thinking About Logic' [OUP 1995], p.118


A Reaction

Are the worlds naturally, or metaphysically, or logically possible?


The 42 ideas from 'Thinking About Logic'

A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
Three traditional names of rules are 'Simplification', 'Addition' and 'Disjunctive Syllogism' [Read]
We should exclude second-order logic, precisely because it captures arithmetic [Read]
A theory of logical consequence is a conceptual analysis, and a set of validity techniques [Read]
Logical consequence isn't just a matter of form; it depends on connections like round-square [Read]
A theory is logically closed, which means infinite premisses [Read]
A logical truth is the conclusion of a valid inference with no premisses [Read]
In second-order logic the higher-order variables range over all the properties of the objects [Read]
Any first-order theory of sets is inadequate [Read]
Compactness does not deny that an inference can have infinitely many premisses [Read]
Compactness is when any consequence of infinite propositions is the consequence of a finite subset [Read]
Compactness blocks the proof of 'for every n, A(n)' (as the proof would be infinite) [Read]
Compactness makes consequence manageable, but restricts expressive power [Read]
Not all validity is captured in first-order logic [Read]
The non-emptiness of the domain is characteristic of classical logic [Read]
Although second-order arithmetic is incomplete, it can fully model normal arithmetic [Read]
Second-order arithmetic covers all properties, ensuring categoricity [Read]
A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read]
The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read]
A haecceity is a set of individual properties, essential to each thing [Read]
Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
The mind abstracts ways things might be, which are nonetheless real [Read]
Von Neumann numbers are helpful, but don't correctly describe numbers [Read]
Necessity is provability in S4, and true in all worlds in S5 [Read]
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read]
Same say there are positive, negative and neuter free logics [Read]
Quantifiers are second-order predicates [Read]
Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read]
Negative existentials with compositionality make the whole sentence meaningless [Read]
Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read]
There are fuzzy predicates (and sets), and fuzzy quantifiers and modifiers [Read]
Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read]
Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]
Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read]
Realisms like the full Comprehension Principle, that all good concepts determine sets [Read]
Infinite cuts and successors seems to suggest an actual infinity there waiting for us [Read]
Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read]