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Single Idea 5489
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
]
Full Idea
It seems that human beings not only have variable dispositional properties, as most complex systems have, but also meta-powers: powers to change their own dispositional properties.
Clarification
'Meta-powers' are powers over other powers
Gist of Idea
Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions
Source
Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.143
A Reaction
This seems to me a key to how we act, and also to morality. 'What dispositions do you want to have?' is the central question of virtue theory. Humans are essentially multi-level thinkers. Irony is the window into the soul.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[desires and emotions as the main motivator of action]:
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1540
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Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad
[Democritus]
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7408
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It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own
[Hobbes, by Tuck]
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2362
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The will is just the last appetite before action
[Hobbes]
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20305
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Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence
[Spinoza]
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5489
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Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions
[Ellis]
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3814
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Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
[Searle]
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23724
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A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief
[Smith,M]
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23723
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In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism
[Smith,M]
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23735
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Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions
[Smith,M]
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23736
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A person can have a desire without feeling it
[Smith,M]
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23738
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Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate
[Smith,M]
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23739
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Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us
[Smith,M]
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23742
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If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win
[Smith,M]
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23746
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Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person
[Smith,M]
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20202
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Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims
[Zagzebski]
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20049
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Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause
[Stout,R]
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20046
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For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it
[Stout,R]
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