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Single Idea 16777

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance ]

Full Idea

Crowds seem to be the bearers of properties, and if they are things at all, then there is no place for them other than in the category of Substance.

Gist of Idea

If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties

Source

Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.1)

Book Ref

Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.609

A Reaction

It is tempting to say, based on Aristotle, that a substance is whatever 1) bears properties, and 2) endures in spite of change, but a crowd is a nice problem case, because it looks too disunited to be a 'substance'.

The 53 ideas from Robert Pasnau

16580 A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau]
16579 There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau]
16584 If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau]
16583 Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau]
16581 Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau]
16586 The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau]
16592 Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau]
16596 A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau]
16598 Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau]
16602 Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]
16603 In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau]
16606 Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau]
16604 Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau]
16605 After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau]
16607 Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau]
16609 Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau]
16610 Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau]
16615 Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau]
16612 Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau]
16613 Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau]
16617 Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau]
16628 Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau]
16568 Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau]
16642 Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau]
16649 Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau]
16653 Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau]
16662 The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]
16671 Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau]
16677 Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau]
16680 Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau]
16694 Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau]
16704 In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau]
16715 Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau]
16722 Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau]
16727 In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau]
16732 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau]
16733 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]
16738 Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau]
16741 Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau]
16747 Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau]
16748 Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau]
16749 Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]
16750 If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau]
16759 Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau]
16760 Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau]
16767 There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
16769 If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau]
16777 If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau]
16775 For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]
16781 The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau]
16783 Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau]
16785 If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau]
16788 Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]