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Single Idea 7936
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
]
Full Idea
Substances have a kind of unity that mere collocations of properties do not have, namely an instrinsic unity. So substances cannot be collocations - bundles - of properties.
Clarification
Things are 'collocated' if they are pulled together
Gist of Idea
Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity
Source
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.91
A Reaction
A team is a unity. Compare a similar thought, Idea 1395, about personal identity. How can something which is a pure unity have more than one property? What distinguishes substances? Why can't a substance have a certain property?
Related Idea
Idea 1395
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]
The
32 ideas
from 'Varieties of Things'
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7923
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'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred?
[Macdonald,C]
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7926
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We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens
[Macdonald,C]
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7965
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Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge?
[Macdonald,C]
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7927
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At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law
[Macdonald,C]
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7928
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The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true
[Macdonald,C]
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7936
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Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity
[Macdonald,C]
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7930
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The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles
[Macdonald,C]
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7932
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A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view
[Macdonald,C]
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7937
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When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology
[Macdonald,C]
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7939
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Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't
[Macdonald,C]
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7940
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A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle
[Macdonald,C]
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7929
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A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence
[Macdonald,C]
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7941
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Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular
[Macdonald,C]
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7942
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The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change
[Macdonald,C]
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7943
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A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible
[Macdonald,C]
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7938
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Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances
[Macdonald,C]
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7934
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Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations)
[Macdonald,C]
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7944
|
Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk
[Macdonald,C]
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7947
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In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself
[Macdonald,C]
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7948
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A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical
[Macdonald,C]
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7933
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Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts
[Macdonald,C]
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7950
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Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible
[Macdonald,C]
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7958
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Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars
[Macdonald,C]
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7967
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Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations
[Macdonald,C]
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7955
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Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances
[Macdonald,C]
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7961
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A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once
[Macdonald,C]
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7959
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How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way?
[Macdonald,C]
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7960
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Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor
[Macdonald,C]
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7951
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Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity?
[Macdonald,C]
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7964
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How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them?
[Macdonald,C]
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7971
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Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets
[Macdonald,C]
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7972
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Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist
[Macdonald,C]
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