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Single Idea 5928
[filed under theme 21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
]
Full Idea
In order to avoid the difficulties that beset both a purely objective and a purely subjective view of beauty, I find myself driven to one which identifies beauty with the power of producing a certain sort of experience in minds.
Gist of Idea
Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events
Source
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV)
Book Ref
Ross,W.David: 'The Right and the Good' [OUP 1930], p.127
A Reaction
This makes beauty a relational quality, rather than an intrinsic one. Ross's theory won't avoid the many usual problems about relativism. Do we define colour similarly, as a power in objects to produce certain sensations?
The
40 ideas
from W. David Ross
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7259
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Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought
[Ross, by Dancy,J]
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5898
|
'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man'
[Ross]
|
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5899
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If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty
[Ross]
|
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5904
|
In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted
[Ross]
|
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5900
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We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty
[Ross]
|
|
5909
|
Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself
[Ross, by PG]
|
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5905
|
We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure
[Ross]
|
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5906
|
Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences
[Ross]
|
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5908
|
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance
[Ross]
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5914
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An act may be described in innumerable ways
[Ross]
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5912
|
We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity
[Ross]
|
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5913
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The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics
[Ross]
|
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5910
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The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure
[Ross]
|
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5911
|
Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics
[Ross]
|
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5916
|
Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things
[Ross]
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5915
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Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any
[Ross]
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5917
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People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others
[Ross]
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5919
|
Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct
[Ross]
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5926
|
The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it
[Ross]
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5924
|
Identical objects must have identical value
[Ross]
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5928
|
Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events
[Ross]
|
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5927
|
I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions
[Ross]
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5922
|
An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances
[Ross]
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5921
|
We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness
[Ross]
|
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5920
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Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind)
[Ross]
|
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5923
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The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality
[Ross]
|
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5918
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The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed
[Ross]
|
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5930
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All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious
[Ross]
|
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5932
|
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge
[Ross]
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5933
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Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight
[Ross]
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5929
|
No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired
[Ross]
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5931
|
All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better
[Ross]
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5939
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Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth
[Ross]
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5937
|
The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction
[Ross]
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5936
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Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain
[Ross]
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5940
|
Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable
[Ross]
|
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5938
|
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is
[Ross]
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5942
|
We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty
[Ross]
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5941
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Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right
[Ross]
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18622
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Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being
[Ross]
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