more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
It is plausible that we find something characteristic of intentional agency when we look inward to the mental precursors of actions, and also when we look outward, to the sensitivity of action to what the environment gives us reasons to do.
Gist of Idea
Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act
Source
Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'How')
Book Ref
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.6
A Reaction
This is Stout staking a claim for his partly externalist view of agency. I warm less and less to the various forms of externalism. How often does the environment 'give us reasons' to do things? How can we act, without internalising those reasons?
| 135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
| 20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
| 20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |