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Full Idea
I identify propositions with certain properties - namely, with those that are instantiated only by entire possible worlds. Then if properties generally are the sets of their instances, a proposition is a set of possible worlds.
Gist of Idea
A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property
Source
David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.5)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [Blackwell 2001], p.53
A Reaction
I don't get this. How can the proposition that tomatoes are edible be an entire set of possible worlds? The proposition seems to be about tomatoes, and nothing else. Should we talk of 'possibilities', rather than of 'possible worlds'?
| 23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
| 15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
| 15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |