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Single Idea 5142

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds ]

Full Idea

We do not speak of an ox or a horse as happy, because none of them can take part in fine deeds; similarly, no child is happy, because its age debars it as yet from such activities.

Gist of Idea

Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds

Source

Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b32)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.81

A Reaction

This is a place where 'happy' is not a very good translation for 'eudaimon', as we universally acknowledge a 'happy childhood'. We can have a 'successful' life, but not a successful childhood. I'm not convinced that even Greeks understood 'eudaimonia'.

The 229 ideas from 'Nicomachean Ethics'

2682 Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle]
4370 For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
21047 Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel]
3559 For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas]
8007 Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
4326 Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
4371 Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
5075 Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle]
18673 Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi]
2681 Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle]
3548 Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle]
4369 It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
4117 Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle]
21044 For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel]
2684 Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle]
20 The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle]
4380 Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
21 Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle]
22 Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle]
23 The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle]
24 Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle]
4119 If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B]
25 You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle]
26 Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle]
21356 Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle]
5128 Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle]
5129 There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle]
5130 It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle]
27 Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle]
5131 Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle]
28 How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle]
18227 We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle]
5132 Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle]
5133 Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle]
30 Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle]
5127 Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle]
5134 Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle]
31 If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle]
33 Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle]
34 The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle]
35 A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle]
5135 Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle]
5136 Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle]
5137 Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle]
5138 The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle]
38 A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle]
5139 If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle]
5140 Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle]
5142 Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle]
39 Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle]
5143 Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle]
5144 Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle]
4342 Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
4381 How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle]
5145 The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle]
5146 Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle]
4383 Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
5147 In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle]
5148 The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle]
5149 The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle]
5150 Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle]
4367 Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle]
43 Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle]
44 We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle]
21046 The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle]
5151 Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle]
5152 Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle]
45 We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle]
46 We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle]
5153 There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle]
3545 The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas]
5154 Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle]
47 Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle]
4406 Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle]
4378 We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
49 Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle]
4382 Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle]
51 True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle]
52 We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle]
53 Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle]
5156 How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle]
6793 People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle]
54 Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle]
57 We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle]
58 If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle]
5157 If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle]
60 The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle]
61 Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle]
4388 One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle]
4373 Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
4387 In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle]
62 We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle]
63 Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle]
64 There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle]
5158 Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
5159 The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle]
5160 There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
4333 Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle]
65 The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle]
5161 To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle]
5211 An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle]
5212 A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle]
5213 If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle]
67 Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle]
5214 Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle]
20192 Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski]
5215 There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle]
5216 An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle]
5217 At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle]
12961 For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
68 The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
4318 Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
4372 Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
24037 We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle]
4391 Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle]
5218 Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle]
5219 Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle]
23320 Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
69 We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
5220 Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle]
5221 Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle]
5222 A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle]
4118 A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
4394 People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle]
4384 For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle]
5223 We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle]
5224 Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle]
5225 The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle]
5226 True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle]
5227 The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle]
5228 A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle]
5229 The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle]
5230 There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle]
71 Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle]
5231 To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle]
5232 If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle]
5233 Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle]
5234 For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle]
5235 Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle]
5236 It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle]
5237 We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
5238 The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle]
4389 What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle]
5239 When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle]
5240 The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle]
5241 We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle]
5242 Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle]
5243 The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle]
23556 Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle]
5245 Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle]
5246 Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle]
72 Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
73 Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
4405 The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
76 The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle]
20212 Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
78 Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle]
5247 Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
79 Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle]
5248 Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle]
80 Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
55 People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle]
56 A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle]
5249 One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
4362 Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle]
81 For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle]
82 The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
4386 Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson]
5250 The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle]
5251 Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle]
22141 It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle]
5252 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle]
5254 Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
5255 A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
23317 Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
23318 Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
5256 Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle]
5257 Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
5258 While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle]
84 The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle]
1665 It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle]
5259 If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle]
383 God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle]
2686 Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
5260 Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle]
5261 Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle]
5262 Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle]
2687 For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
85 Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle]
5263 Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle]
5264 Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle]
86 A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle]
87 Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle]
5265 Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle]
88 Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle]
5266 It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle]
90 All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle]
91 A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle]
5267 Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
92 Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle]
2689 Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle]
2690 Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle]
2573 To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle]
93 Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle]
95 If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle]
4374 For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
5268 Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle]
96 Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle]
97 There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle]
5269 Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle]
98 It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle]
5270 Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle]
99 If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle]
100 The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle]
101 Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle]
103 Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle]
18229 Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle]
104 Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle]
5272 The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle]
105 We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle]
106 The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle]
107 A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle]
108 The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle]
109 Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle]
18232 The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle]
110 Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle]
111 The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle]
4379 It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle]
112 Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle]