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Single Idea 4066

[filed under theme 28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof ]

Full Idea

The view that 'exists' is never a predicate is not plausible.

Clarification

'Exists' (here) is a property ascribed to something

Gist of Idea

It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate

Source

Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7)

Book Ref

Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.24

A Reaction

He doesn't enlarge. Russell says 'exists' is a quantifier. 'Your very existence offends me - I hope it is confiscated'.

The 42 ideas from 'Elements of Mind'

4063 In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane]
4065 Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane]
4067 Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
4066 It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane]
4069 Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane]
4070 Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
4071 Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane]
4072 The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
4073 Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
4076 Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane]
4075 Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
4074 Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
4077 Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane]
4078 Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane]
4079 Properties are causes [Crane]
4080 If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
4084 Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane]
4082 The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane]
4083 If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane]
4085 Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
4068 Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane]
4087 Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
4089 Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
4090 Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane]
4092 The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane]
4091 The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane]
4093 Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane]
4094 Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
4096 Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane]
4095 Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
4097 Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane]
4098 The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane]
4100 The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
4101 If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]
4102 The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]
4104 One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane]
4103 The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane]
4106 If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane]
4105 The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane]
4108 Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane]
4107 With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane]
4109 If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane]