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Single Idea 18535

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems ]

Full Idea

A capacity for abstraction is central to our capacity to think about the universe systematically.

Gist of Idea

Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically

Source

John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 09.7)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'The Universe as We Find It' [OUP 2012], p.195

A Reaction

This strikes me as obvious. We pick out the similarities, and then discuss them, as separate from their bearers. We explain why things have features in common. Some would just say systematic thinking needs universals, but that's less good.

The 141 ideas from John Heil

7001 If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil]
7004 The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil]
7003 There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil]
7007 I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil]
7009 Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil]
7008 Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil]
7010 Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil]
7011 Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil]
7002 If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil]
7012 If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil]
7013 The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil]
7015 A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil]
7018 Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil]
7017 The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil]
7016 The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil]
7019 Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil]
7020 Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil]
7021 If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil]
7023 Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
7025 Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
7026 Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil]
7027 Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
7028 If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil]
7029 Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil]
7030 Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil]
7032 Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil]
7034 Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil]
7036 The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil]
7035 God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil]
7037 Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil]
7038 A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil]
7039 How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil]
7044 Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil]
7045 Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil]
7041 Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil]
7042 A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil]
7043 Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil]
7046 Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
7047 Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil]
7048 Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil]
7051 Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil]
7052 Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil]
7053 Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil]
7054 Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil]
7057 Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil]
7058 Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil]
7060 One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil]
7059 The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]
7061 Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil]
7062 Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil]
7063 Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil]
7064 Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil]
7066 If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil]
7065 Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil]
4588 There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil]
4587 From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil]
4586 You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil]
4591 Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil]
4592 If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil]
4590 If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil]
4593 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
4596 The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil]
4597 Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
4595 No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil]
4594 A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]
4598 Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
4601 Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil]
4602 Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil]
4599 Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil]
4603 Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil]
4607 Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil]
4609 It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil]
4604 If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil]
4605 Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil]
4606 To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil]
4625 Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil]
4619 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil]
4620 Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil]
4622 Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil]
4614 Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil]
4624 If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil]
4610 Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil]
4618 If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil]
4621 Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil]
4623 Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil]
4626 The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil]
4617 A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil]
4616 A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil]
4612 Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil]
4615 Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil]
4611 The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil]
21339 We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil]
21351 Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil]
21350 If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
21344 If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil]
21349 Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil]
21348 In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil]
21340 Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil]
18495 The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil]
18494 Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil]
18505 Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil]
18504 Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil]
18506 Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil]
18507 Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil]
18508 Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil]
18509 Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil]
18510 We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil]
18511 Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
18512 Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil]
18513 Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil]
18514 Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil]
18515 Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil]
18516 A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil]
18517 Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil]
18518 Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil]
18519 If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil]
18520 Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil]
18522 Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
18523 Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil]
18524 Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil]
18525 Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil]
18526 We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil]
18527 Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil]
18531 Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil]
18532 If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil]
18533 In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil]
18534 Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil]
18497 Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil]
18498 Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil]
18496 If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil]
18500 How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil]
18499 Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
18502 If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil]
18501 Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil]
18503 You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil]
18535 Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil]
18536 The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil]
18538 Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil]
18537 Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil]
18539 Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil]
18540 Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil]