more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 15802

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis ]

Full Idea

My use of variables is not merely pedantic; it indicates that the various items on our list pertain to one and the same entity throughout.

Gist of Idea

I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout

Source

Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], Intro 2)

Book Ref

Chisholm,Roderick: 'Person and Object' [Open Court 1976], p.17

A Reaction

I am one of those poor souls who finds modern analytic philosophy challenging simply because I think in terms of old fashioned words, instead of thinking like mathematicians and logicians. This is a nice defence of their approach.

The 32 ideas from 'Person and Object'

15801 Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm]
15802 I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm]
15803 Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm]
15809 A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm]
15804 If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm]
15805 Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
15807 A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
15808 A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
15806 The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
15810 Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm]
15811 I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm]
15813 People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm]
15814 A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm]
15815 Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm]
15819 Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
15816 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm]
15817 If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm]
15818 So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm]
15821 Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm]
15820 A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm]
15822 The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm]
15823 Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm]
15824 There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm]
15826 There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm]
15827 Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
15828 I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]
15829 The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm]
15830 Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
15831 Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
15832 Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
12852 If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons]
12851 Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons]