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Full Idea
Things that don't exist don't have any properties.
Gist of Idea
Things that don't exist don't have any properties
Source
Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Azzouni,Jody: 'Deflating Existential Consequence' [OUP 2004], p.87
A Reaction
Sounds reasonable! I totally agree, but that is because my notion of properties is sparse and naturalistic. If you identify properties with predicates (which some weird people seem to), then non-existents can have properties like 'absence' or 'nullity'.
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
| 12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
| 12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
| 12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
| 12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
| 12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
| 12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
| 12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |
| 12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |